The Hirota Gambit by Huq, Aziz
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship
2007
The Hirota Gambit
Aziz Huq
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Aziz Huq, "The Hirota Gambit," 63 New York University Annual Survey of American Law 63 (2007).
THE HIROTA GAMBIT
AZIZ HUQ*
INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1950s, federal courts have exercised jurisdiction
over U.S. citizens' habeas corpus petitions asserting extraterritorial
violations of constitutional rights.1 Elaborated first by Justice Hugo
Black in a four-Justice plurality in Reid v. Covert,2 constitutional lim-
its to executive action against citizens overseas received confirma-
tion in post-war cases arising out of U.S. military operations in
Europe and Japan. 3 The scope of citizens' constitutional entitle-
* Director, Liberty and National Security Project, Brennan Center forJustice
at New York University School of Law and Adjunct Professor of Law, New York
University School of Law. I am also counsel in the Omar and Munaf cases
mentioned below, and I benefited beyond measure from discussions with co-
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1. The first exercise of this jurisdiction occurred in the 1949 case of In re Bush,
336 U.S. 971 (1949); see also In re Bush, 84 F. Supp. 873 (D.D.C. 1949). Typically
cited today for the availability of extraterritorial jurisdiction are Burns v. Wilson,
346 U.S. 137, 139 (1953), in which the Court exercised habeas jurisdiction on
behalf of a serviceman detained in Guam, and Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 526
(1957) (per curiam), which involved the exercise of jurisdiction on behalf of a
petitioner held in Japan. See generally Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Civilian Judges and
Military Justice: Collateral Review of Court-Martial Convictions, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 40,
51-52 n.60 (1961) (collecting cases); infra notes 70-71.
2. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957) (Black, J., plurality opinion)
("When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield
which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his
life and liberty should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in an-
other land.").
3. See id. at 75 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result). Justice Harlan, casting
the controlling vote in Reid, stated that the kinds of constitutional rights that ex-
tended overseas depended on "the particular local setting, the practical necessities,
and the possible alternatives .... " Id. Several cases after Reid limited the military's
authority to try criminally non-military personnel through military justice mecha-
nisms that lacked the full panoply of constitutional procedural protections. In
some (but not all) of these cases, the habeas petitioner was still outside the United
States at the time of the writ's filing. See, e.g., Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278
(1960) (successful petitioner tried by U.S. court-martial in France, then incarcer-
ated in Pennsylvania, from where he filed a habeas writ); McElroy v. United States
ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960) (petitioner filed writ challenging court-
martial jurisdiction from Morocco before being transferred to detention in Penn-
sylvania); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960) (successful
63
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ment overseas remains contested, but there is nevertheless little
question that some measure of constitutional protection extends
beyond U.S. borders to shelter citizens. 4 Since then, such jurisdic-
tion has rarely been exercised. 5 But it also, as a practical matter,
has rarely seemed in doubt-at least until now.
In recent habeas corpus proceedings concerning United States
citizens seized and detained overseas, the Government has argued
that habeas is unavailable to these citizens under certain condi-
tions. Prerequisites for this purported exception to habeas jurisdic-
tion are fuzzily defined. But, they seem to hinge on endorsement
of the detention or its broader operational context by an interna-
tional entity such as the United Nations Security Council. This pro-
posed exception stands poised to swallow the rule. It creates an
open-ended category of cases in which the government does not
have to establish before an independent magistrate the legal au-
thority or factual predicates for a citizen's extraterritorial deten-
tion. Moreover, since challenges to transfers between sovereigns
are accomplished through habeas corpus review, U.S. citizens
would also be barred from challenging their transfer to another
sovereign's custody.6
This essay criticizes this purported exception, which is based
on a rarely cited 1948 Supreme Court per curiam decision, Hirota v.
MacArthur.7 It argues that the Government's Hirota gambit ought
petitioner arrested and tried in Germany, and then detained in West Virginia);
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (habeas relief granted
where petitioner, a former serviceman, was arrested in Pittsburgh and transported
to Korea for court-martial); cf Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952) (habeas
review to ascertain whether the U.S. Court of the Allied High Commission for
Germany had proper jurisdiction over petitioner, although petitioner had been
transferred to West Virginia).
4. For an early effort to grapple with these questions, see Ralpho v. Bell, 569
F.2d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
5. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), is the key exception. See also
United States ex rel. Keefe v. Dulles, 222 F.2d 390, 392-94 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (denying
the writ when petitioner, detained by French government pursuant to a criminal
conviction, could not show constitutional rights violated by U.S. action; also exer-
cising mandamus jurisdiction, but denying extraordinary relief); Abu Ali v. Ash-
croft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28, 68-69 (D.D.C. 2004) (acknowledging the possibility of
habeas jurisdiction for a U.S. citizen held overseas by a foreign sovereign at U.S.
direction).
6. See Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of
Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 995 (1998) (habeas guarantees "inquiry into deten-
tion for the purpose of delivery to a foreign government" to examine its legality);
see generally Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933); Elias v. Ramirez, 215
U.S. 398 (1910).
7. 338 U.S. 197 (1948) (per curiam).
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not to succeed. There is no exception-and especially no open-
ended one-to the principle that American citizens physically de-
tained overseas by American officials may properly invoke habeas
corpus jurisdiction to challenge the factual and legal bases of their
detention.8
Much confusion arises from the opacity of the Hirota decision.
Hirota involved a petition for a habeas writ filed directly in the Su-
preme Court by the former prime minister ofJapan and others who
had been tried in the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East. Hirota was detained by General Douglas MacArthur-but,
crucially, Hirota collaterally challenged the judgment and sentence
of an international tribunal, rather than the authority of General
MacArthur to detain him. The Supreme Court rejected Hirota's
petition in a three-paragraph, citation-free per curiam opinion is-
sued only three days after oral argument.9
The Government today argues that Hirota stands for the pro-
position that when United States forces act under the "auspices" of
"multinational" authority-for example, pursuant to a resolution
from the United Nations Security Council-no habeas relief is avail-
able. 10 An officer of the United States Army operating under inter-
national authority may thus seize and hold an American citizen
without answering for that detention in federal court. Simply by
asserting multinational jurisdiction, indefinite detention of U.S. cit-
izens would become feasible.
But Hirota has no such sweeping consequence. The case neces-
sarily rests on a limited proposition concerning the boundaries of
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction. While its dicta sweep more
broadly, this simply reflects the then-recently decided precedent of
Ahrens v. Clark, which suggested that the territorial jurisdiction of a
district court was strictly limited by the habeas statute to the geo-
graphic bounds of that court's district. '' But this absolute limit on
statutory jurisdiction is no longer good law.' 2 Whatever sui generis
8. Cf Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 58 (1968) (A habeas petitioner "may re-
quire his jailor tojustify the detention under the law.");Jones v. Cunningham, 371
U.S. 236, 238 (1963) ("[I]n the United States, the chief use of habeas corpus has
been to seek the release of persons held in actual, physical custody in prison or jail."
(emphasis added)); Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 572 (1885) (Issuance of the
writ requires "actual confinement or the present means of enforcing it.").
9. See Hirola, 338 U.S. at 198.
10. See, e.g., Reply Brief for the Appellants at 2, Omar v. Harvey, No. 06-5126
(D.C. Cir. July 21, 2006).
11. 335 U.S. 188, 192 (1948).
12. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 495 (1973);
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 478-79 (2004).
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limits still apply to Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction are not
general bars on the proper exercise of district court habeas
jurisdiction.1 3
The Hirota gambit has special salience today. Historian Arthur
Schlesinger described America today as possessing "an informal em-
pire-military bases, status-of-forces agreements, trade concessions,
multinational corporations, cultural penetrations, and other fa-
vors."1 4 The United States, moreover, is entangled in innumerable
international alliances, from the United Nations to multinational
agreements to fight financial crime, to bilateral agreements on nar-
cotics interdiction.1 5 Despite America's global presence, Congress
does not always legislate with an eye across borders. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has adopted a clear statement rule that, in practical
effect, imposes additional decisional costs on legislators who wish to
extend the reach of federal law across U.S. borders. 16 The result is
frequent ambiguity concerning overseas conduct rules that raises
questions about the preservation of the rule of law for transnational
executive action.
Statutory and treaty-based humanitarian laws of war, for exam-
ple, contain significant gaps in the protection U.S. citizens enjoy
from executive action. Two particular instances stand out. First,
Americans detained in an area of armed conflict, such as Afghani-
stan and Iraq, are not protected by international humanitarian law
in the same manner as the populations of the countries where con-
flict is occurring. 17 Second, the legal status of American troops
13. 1 thus propose a narrower, less ambitious reading of Hirota than Professor
Stephen Vladeck, who rests his admirably ambitious thesis on the structural quali-
ties of Article III of the Constitution. Stephen I. Vladeck, Deconstructing Hirota:
Habeas Corpus, Citizenship, and Article III, 95 GEO. L. J. 1497 (2007).
14. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The American Empire? Not So Fast, 22 WORLD POL'Y.
J. 43, 45 (2005).
15. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 1-35 (2004).
16. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) ("It is a long-
standing principle of American law that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary
intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Small v. United States, 544
U.S. 385, 399 (2005); Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285-86 (1949).
Since at least 1976, however, it has been clear that facile classifications of "domes-
tic" and "foreign" are misleading. See Bayless Manning, The Congress, the Executive
and Intermestic Affairs: Three Proposals, 55 FOREIGN AFF. 306, 307-10 (1976-77); see also
Brian Galle, Getting Spending: How to Replace Clear Statement Rules with Clear Thinking
About Conditional Grants of Federal Funds, 37 CONN. L. REV. 155, 177 (2004) (noting
"heightened bargaining costs" of clear statement rules in legislative log-rolling).
17. The 1949 Geneva Conventions are designed principally for citizens of
other powers who are swept up, as soldiers or as citizens, in the course of combat.
Article 4 of the Geneva Convention IV protects persons who "at a given moment
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overseas is sometimes hazardously ambiguous. Typically, the
United States signs a "status of forces" agreement with another sov-
ereign setting forth jurisdictional rules and rights.' 8 In some cases,
however, U.S. forces are stationed overseas in the absence of a sta-
tus-of-forces agreement. In 2007, as of this writing, this was the case
in Yemen (where the assault on the U.S.S. Cole occurred) and
Thailand.19 In the absence of enforceable legal protections, a U.S.
citizen stationed among or working alongside U.S. forces in either
of those countries would have no judicial protection from being
seized and turned over to Yemeni or Thai authorities.
To begin, this essay places the Hirota gambit in context. Part I
canvasses recent doctrinal moves by the Justice Department in Su-
preme Court briefs and in Office of Legal Counsel opinions aimed
at shifting detention operations outside the aegis of the federal
courts. The Hirota gambit is thus the latest in this series of doctri-
nal efforts to establish a law-free zone. Part II turns to Hirota and
provides historical and jurisprudential context. In recent cases, one
arising out of a detention in Saudi Arabia 20 and others arising out
of Iraq operations, the Government has argued that Hirota ought to
apply to citizens. 2' Without contending that citizenship is irrele-
vant, I argue that Hirota in fact rests on an even narrower ground:
the limits of Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction. Part III of the
essay presents further extrinsic support for a narrow reading of
Hirota.
and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation,
in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not
nationals." Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War of August 12, 1949 art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S.
287 (emphasis added). But see In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 143-45 (9th Cir. 1946)
(classifying a U.S. citizen, who had been fighting with Italian forces, as a POW).
Instead, it appears the Conventions' drafters presumed that "the safeguards of do-
mestic law" would apply to these persons, obviating any need for international-law
protection. See Major Richard R. Baxter, So-Called 'Un-privileged Belligerency: Spies,
Guerrillas, and Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L. L. 323, 332 (1951).
18. Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 2501, 2512
(2005) ("The United States, with its far-flung force commitments, relies upon
these agreements extensively.").
19. John W. Egan, Comment, The Future of Criminal Jurisdiction over the Deployed
American Soldier: Four Major Trends in Bilateral U.S. Status of Forces Agreements, 20 EM-
ORY INT'L L. REV. 291, 305-06 & n.ll0 (2006).
20. See Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28, 55 (D.D.C. 2004).
21. See Omar v. Harvey, 416 F. Supp. 2d 19, 24 (D.D.C. 2006), affid 479 F.3d 1
(D.C. Cir. 2007); Munaf v. Harvey, 456 F. Supp. 2d 115, 124 (D.D.C. 2006), affd
sub nom. Munaf v. Geren, 482 F.3d 582 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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I.
WANTED: LAW-FREE ZONES
The Hirota gambit is the latest in a series of doctrinal sallies by
the Government in terrorism-related cases aimed at establishing
zones free of judicial supervision. Justice Department legal memo-
randa and opinions have argued toward the goal of ending judicial
supervision of counter-terrorism operations. The Justice Depart-
ment's arguments concerning Guantdnamo and its argument in the
first citizen enemy combatant case-both of which prefigure its de-
ployment of Hirota-are data points in this trend.
A. Guantdnamo
On December 28, 2001, Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") Dep-
uty Assistant Attorneys General Patrick F. Philbin and John C. Yoo
issued a legal memorandum to the General Counsel of the Defense
Department asserting that "federal courts lack jurisdiction over
habeas petitions filed by alien detainees held outside the sovereign
territory of the United States," and in particular at the GuantAnamo
Bay Naval Base in Cuba.2 2 Philbin and Yoo, though, noted some
"litigation risk" of detainee lawsuits.2 3 This term, and their concern
that litigation might "interfere" with detention operations, suggests
that their analysis was driven by the desire to avoid the costs ofjudi-
cial supervision. 2 4
Other elements strengthen the impression that the Justice De-
partment's goal was to establish a law-free zone for detention and
interrogation operations. The OLC memo's analysis of Guantd-
namo's sovereignty, for example, is striking in its omission of salient
facts. No mention is made of the historical circumstances of Guan-
tnamo's occupation by the United States. The 1901 Platt Amend-
ment reserved to the United States a "right to intervene in Cuba
militarily and to control its economy and its relations with other
countries"; subsequently, Guant;Anamo became a holding pen for
22. Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin and John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant
Attorneys General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to William J.
Haynes, II, General Counsel, Dep't of Defense, Possible Habeas Jurisdiction over
Aliens Held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 1 (Dec. 28, 2001), http://www.texscience.
org/reform/torture/philbin-yoo-habeas-28decOl.pdf [hereinafter Philbin-Yoo
Memo].
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1, 8. For a theoretically sophisticated argument for judicial defer-
ence in the detention context, see ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN
THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY AND THE COURTS 252-57 (2007).
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Haitian refugees.2 5 Facts such as these run starkly counter to the
flat denial of sovereignty proposed by the OLC memo, and at mini-
mum merited some analysis, even if eventually determined to be
irrelevant. By tearing their analysis of the United States-Cuba lease
from historical context, Yoo and Philbin strengthened their claim
that America lacked "sovereignty" over the base. 26
Philbin and Yoo also noted that a federal court exercising juris-
diction would not be able to grant any relief "other than to deny [a
petitioner] habeas jurisdiction in the first place. ' 27 They thus as-
sumed the answer to a deeply unsettled constitutional question: the
extension of constitutional rights to non-citizens outside the United
States. 28 By assuming this question away, they fortified their con-
tention that detention operations could proceed at Guantinamo
unhindered by judicial scrutiny.
Further support for the inference that the Government sought
a law-free zone comes from Yoo's memoir. Yoo explains that the
administration's early focus on Guantdnamo was motivated by the
concern that "if federal courts took jurisdiction over POW camps
[which Guantinamo was not, and was never meant to be], they
might start to run them by their own lights, substituting familiar
peacetime prison standards for military needs and standards." 29
This points to a principled aversion to judicial oversight of any
kind.30
Government lawyers reprised the same argument, without
avail, in a habeas challenge filed by Guantdnamo detainees before
the Supreme Court. Relying on the post-World War II precedent of
25. Amy Kaplan, Where is Guanidnamo?, in LEGAL BORDERLANDS: LAW AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN BORDERS 239, 243, 247 (Mary Dudziak & Leti Volpp,
eds., 2006).
26. Philbin-Yoo Memo, supra note 22, at 3-5.
27. Id. at 8.
28. See Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 984, 994 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding
that federal courts lack jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by aliens captured
abroad and detained as enemy combatants at GUant~inamo), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.
1478 (Apr. 2, 2007).
29. JOHN Yoo, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON
TERROR 142 (2006). For some indication of what "military needs and standards"
involved, see, for example, Jane Mayer, The Experiment, NEW YORKER, July 11, 2005,
at 60; Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse in Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
30, 2004, at Al.
30. See John Yoo, Enemy Combatants and the Problem of Judicial Competence, in
TERRORISM, THE LAWS OF WAR, AND THE CONSTITUTION: DEBATING THE ENEMY COM-
BATANT CASES 69, 88 (Peter Berkowitz ed., 2005).
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Johnson v. Eisentrager,31 the Solicitor General argued that habeas ju-
risdiction did not extend to Guantdnamo, invoking, inter alia, the
canon against extra-territorial application of statutes.3 2 Like the
OLC memo, the Solicitor General provided little context for its
reading of the Guantdnamo lease.33 Moreover, the Government's
brief invoked separation-of-powers rationales to limit judicial super-
vision. It explicitly referred to the need to keep interrogations free
of judicial supervision and claimed that a finding of jurisdiction
"would thrust the federal courts into the extraordinary role of re-
viewing the military's conduct of hostilities overseas. ' 34 This latter
argument was especially striking since the Government never al-
leged that Guantdnamo itself was the site of armed conflict. 35
B. Hamdi: Enemy Combatant Determinations
The Government again sought to establish a law-free zone with
regard to designated individuals-rather than in a particular terri-
tory-in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.36 In Hamdi, the Government advanced
no argument about de jure jurisdiction, but argued that the federal
court's jurisdiction over the claims of a U.S. citizen detained on
U.S. soil as an "enemy combatant" was a defacto hollow vessel. Such
review, argued the Government, is "of the 'most limited scope,' and
should focus on whether the military is authorized to detain an in-
dividual that it has determined is an enemy combatant." 37 As Jus-
tice Souter noted, the Government's focus on the aggregate
detention scheme left the "judicial enquiry so limited" as to be "vir-
tually worthless as a way to contest detention."38 Whatever conces-
31. 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (rejecting habeas petitions from German citizens who
were convicted by military commissions and detained in a military prison in
Germany).
32. Brief for Respondents at 19, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), (Nos. 03-
334, 03-343), 2004 WL 425739.
33. See id. at 21-23.
34. Id. at 43.
35. By relevant contrast, German POWs were also detained across the United
States in the aftermath of World War II. See, e.g., James E. Fickle & Donald W.
Ellis, POWs in the Piney Woods: German Prisoners of War in the Southern Lumber Industry,
1943-1945, 56J. So. HIST. 695 (1990).
36. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
37. Brief for Respondents at 26, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No.
03-6696) [hereinafter Hamdi Brief].
38. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 541 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part,
and concurring in the judgment). A plurality of the Court held otherwise. Id. at
535-39 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). Professors Posner and Vermeule have
argued that Hamdi was "a cheap victory for civil liberties." POSNER & VERMEULE,
supra note 24, at 257.
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sion of jurisdiction the Government had made was "more
theoretical than practical, leaving the assertion of Executive author-
ity close to unconditional.
'
"
39
In support of its decision to detain Hamdi, the Government
also offered a sworn declaration from the Special Advisor to the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Michael H. Mobbs, alleging
various hostile acts on Hamdi's part.40 The Government argued
that courts could not delve beyond the surface of Mobbs'
statement.
The Court however declined to accept the ipse dixit of this gov-
ernment official, and required a judicial hearing to examine the
factual and legal bases of Hamdi's detention.41 Rather than allow
Mobbs's factual allegations against Mr. Hamdi to be tested, the gov-
ernment released Hamdi in October 2004 without any criminal
punishment for his alleged bad acts. 42
C. The Hirota Gambit
The Hirota argument for quashing jurisdiction is the successor
of the Guantdnamo and enemy combatant arguments. It too would
carve out a zone free ofjudicial review. Like the Guantdnamo argu-
ment, the Hirota gambit focuses on the label denoting sovereignty
affixed to a particular circumstance.
39. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 541 (Souter,J., concurring in part, dissenting in part,
and concurring in the judgment).
40. Hamdi Brief, supra note 37, at 6-7, 27-29.
41. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 526-27, 533 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). Key
questions remain about the nature and mechanics of this proceeding. A recent
judgment of the Canadian Supreme Court identifies with precision the elements
of due process that are key to "fundamental justice" in the context of counter-
terrorism detentions. See Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),
2007 S.C.C. 9, 30762, [2007] S.C.J. No. 9 QUICKLAW (Feb. 23, 2007). In para-
graph 29 of that decision, Justice McLaughlin explained that due process at mini-
mum "comprises the right to a hearing. It requires that the hearing be before an
independent and impartial magistrate. It demands a decision by the magistrate on
the facts and the law. And it entails the right to know the case put against one, and
the ight to answer that case." Id. 29 (emphasis omitted).
42. See Owen Fiss, The War Against Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 26 OXFORDJ.
LEGAL STUD. 235, 245 n.30 (2006). For more details on Michael Mobbs and why
the Government might not have wanted his declaration scrutinized, see Robert
O'Harrow Jr., Waxman Raises New Questions on Cheney, WASH. POST, June 14, 2004,
at A4; see also Grif Witte, Iraq Oil Pipeline Behind Schedule; Key Project Has Largely Gone
Unmonitored, Report Says, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2006, at A12.
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The Government first deployed the Hirota argument in two
cases: Abu Ali v. Ashcroft and Omar v. Harvey.4 3 The first concerned
a U.S. citizen detained by Saudi authorities in Saudi Arabia alleg-
edly at the behest of the United States. 44 In the second case, a U.S.
citizen was detained in Iraq under the authority of allegedly mul-
tinational forces. 45 In both, Government briefs focused on the non-
U.S. aspect of the detention and attempted to analogize the case to
Hirota, and thus to a purported gap in habeas review.
In Abu Ali, the Government, citing Hirota, contended that
"habeas jurisdiction does not lie with respect to detention by for-
eign powers abroad. '46 The Government argued that Hirota could
be interpreted to limit the subject-matter jurisdiction of the district
court, or could be read as an "inherent limitation on the Court's
habeas powers. '47 The Government also invoked the act of state
and political question doctrines as grounds for dismissal of the
case.48 Rejecting these arguments, the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia distinguished Abu Ali from Hirota on citizenship
grounds: "The United States can hardly rely on a decision involving
non-resident aliens challenging the sentence of a foreign military tri-
bunal as controlling precedent for a rule that citizens lack any rights
in habeas to challenge their detention ....
The Hirota argument in Omar was more complex. Omar in-
volves a U.S. citizen seized by U.S. personnel in Baghdad, Iraq, in
October 2004 and thereafter held without access to the federal
courts. 50 The Government argued that Hirota does not allow
habeas jurisdiction when petitioners' actual captors, although U.S.
personnel, are acting under the authority of a resolution from the
U.N. Security Council. Summarizing its argument for the Court of
Appeals, the Government explained:
43. Omar v. Harvey, 416 F. Supp. 2d 19, 24 (D.D.C. 2006), affd 479 F.3d 1
(D.C. Cir. 2007); Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28, 55 (D.D.C. 2004). I do
not discuss here another Iraq case that poses slightly different issues. See Munaf v.
Harvey, 456 F. Supp. 2d 115, 124 (D.D.C. 2006), affd sub nom. Munaf v. Geren, 482
F.3d 582 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
44. See Abu Ali, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 31-33.
45. See Omar, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 21.
46. See Response to Order to Show Case [sic] Supporting Dismissal of the
Petition and Opposition to Petitioners' Motion to Compel Discovery and Produc-
tion at 1, 4-5, Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2004) (No. 04-1258
(JDB), available at http://www.humanrightsusa.org/modules.php?op=modload&
name=News&file=article&sid=1 3.
47. Id. at 5 n.3.
48. Id. at 13-21.
49. Abu Ali, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 55.
50. Omar, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 21.
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In Hirota, the Supreme Court held, because the petitioners'
sentences had been imposed by an international tribunal,
there was no habeas jurisdiction over a petition filed by Japa-
nese prisoners held by (and some of whom were about to be
executed by) United States military officers under a direct
chain of command from the United States. The Court ad-
hered to this view despite the fact[ ] that the international tri-
bunal had been established by General Douglas MacArthur in
his role as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers ....
Here, the relationship between the United States and Omar's
custody is directly analogous to that in Hirota. Omar is being
held by United States military officers, but they are acting as
part of an international body - the MNF-1 - which derives au-
thority from United Nations Security Council resolutions is-
sued at the request of the sovereign Government of Iraq. 51
The same argument ran through the Government's Omar brief in
different forms-as a contention about "the auspices" 52 of the de-
tention or an assertion that the detention was "in accordance with
United Nations Security Council Resolutions."
5
-
After a district court issued a preliminary injunction, 54 a panel
of the D.C. Circuit affirmed that the federal courts properly exer-
cised jurisdiction over Omar's habeas petition. The panel identi-
fied four factors in the Hirota decision and held that the absence of
two of those factors, foreign citizenship and a criminal conviction,
distinguished the case. 55 In the section of the opinion most rele-
vant to the argument here, the D.C. Circuit concluded that Hirota
was a jurisdictional rule that applied to the lower district courts as
much as to the Supreme Court.56
In sum, the lesson drawn by the Government from Hirota is
simply this: Hirota "divests U.S. courts of habeas jurisdiction '5 7 to
review the claims of American citizens held directly by U.S. officials
who act in accord with the mandate of an international organiza-
tion. Like the Hamdi argument, this contention lacks geographic
boundaries: it would apply with equal vigor to a detention con-
51. Brief for the Appellants at 15-16, Omar v. Harvey, No. 06-5126 (D.C. Cir.
June 2, 2006).
52. Id. at 2, 26.
53. Id. at 5.
54. Omar, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 21.
55. Omar v. Harvey, 479 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
56. See id. at 7-8.
57. Brief for the Appellants at 16, Omar v. Harvey, No. 06-5126 (D.C. Cir.
June 2, 2006).
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ducted on United States soil as it would to one in Iraq or Afghani-
stan. A person (including a U.S. citizen) detained by a joint
operation of the Washington, D.C. police and Safidi personnel
guarding the Saudi embassy, for example, would not be entitled to
habeas review. At least, there is no clear reason in any of the Gov-
ernment's formulations to distinguish between a detention overseas
and one on American soil.
But does Hirota-a case that has been cited all of four times by
the Supreme Court-even stand for a jurisdictional bar this wide?
Is Hirota a case about the general scope of federal court power, or
does it in fact stand for a much narrower proposition, a closely de-
fined proposition commensurate to its thinly reasoned text?
II.
WHAT HIROTA MEANS
A. Hirota
On November 29, 1948, former Foreign Minister and Prime
Minister of Japan Koki Hirota filed a motion for leave to file a
habeas petition in the Supreme Court of the United States. 58
Hirota had been tried on nine counts, and convicted on three
counts, in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, or
IMTFE, a tribunal of judges from several nations that opened its
doors in May 1946. 59 Hirota had been Japan's Foreign Minister in
1937-38, during the Rape of Nanking.60 In that regard, he was con-
victed of "[w] aging war against China" and "[d] isregard of duty to
secure observance of and prevent breaches of Laws of War."61
The IMTFE was created by General Douglas MacArthur, acting
as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, on January 19,
1946.62 The tribunal was staffed by eleven judges from different
Allied nations, all appointed by MacArthur. MacArthur's authority
to establish and staff the IMTFE flowed from an agreement signed
in Moscow in December 1945 by the United States, United King-
58. Motion for Leave to File Annexed Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus on
Behalf of Koki Hirota and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, at 36, Hirota v.
MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948) (No. 239) [hereinafter Hirota Brief]; RFacHAn H.
MINEAR, VICTORS' JUSTICE: THE ToKYo WAR CRIMES TIAL 3-4 (1971).
59. MINEAR, supra note 58, at 3, 203.
60. Id. at 71.
61. Id. at 203; see generally SABURO SHIROYAMA, WAR CRIMINAL: THE LIFE AND
DEATH OF HIROTA KoKi (John Bester trans., Kodansha International Ltd. 1977)
(1974).
62. HowARD BALL, PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES AND GENOCIDE 71, 77 (1999).
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dom, and the Soviet Union with the concurrence of China. 63 The
tribunal sat for more than two years deliberating on charges against
twenty-eight men. It held 818 court sessions, heard 419 witnesses,
took 7779 affidavits and declarations, and then took seven months
to reach a verdict. Ultimately, three judges dissented from the
judgment in its entirety and two others wrote concurrences. 6 4
Hirota lodged his habeas petition directly in the Supreme
Court rather than in a district court. His was not the first habeas
petition to be so filed in the High Court. During the 1946, 1947,
and 1948 Terms, the Court confronted "a hundred-odd original
cases from overseas" involving Germans and Japanese convicted of
war crimes. On one day alone in May 1949, the Court received fifty-
eight petitions from the Nfurnberg trials.65
This glut of High Court filings may be explained by the juris-
dictional landscape of the day. At the time that Hirota filed his
petition, it seemed almost certain that no district court had statu-
tory jurisdiction to adjudicate a habeas petition filed by a citizen
detained overseas. Six months prior to Hirota, the Supreme Court
ruled in Ahrens v. Clark that a district court lacked habeas jurisdic-
tion when a person was detained outside the court's territorial juris-
diction and in another district court's territorial jurisdiction.
Justice Douglas's majority opinion in Ahrens appeared to treat the
statutory phrase "within their respective jurisdictions" in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 as an absolute bar to a district court's oversight of detentions
outside its territorial ambit.6 6 Although a footnote in Ahrens
seemed to leave open the question of the habeas statute's extrater-
ritorial reach, 6 7 district courts6 8 and respected commentators69 saw
63. The Secretary General, Memorandum Submitted by the Secretay-General re:
Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction, Delivered to the
International Law Commission, 23 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/7/Rev.1 (1949).
64. BALL, supra note 62, at 79; see also Louis FISHER, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND
PRESIDENTIAL POWER: AMERICAN REVOLUTION TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 150-51
(2005); TIM MAGA, JUDGMENT AT TOKYO: THE JAPANESE WAR CRIMES TRIALS 120-38
(2001).
65. Charles Fairman, Some New Problems of the Constitution Following the Tag, I
STAN. L. REv. 587, 600 (1949); see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 316 (5th ed. 2003)
(collecting cases).
66. Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 190-93 (1948).
67. Id. at 192 n.4.
68. See, e.g., Ex parte Flick, 76 F. Supp. 979 (D.D.C. 1948), aff'd, 174 F.2d 983
(D.C. Cir. 1949).
69. Fairman, supra note 65, at 632 ("[I]f the statute makes the presence of the
petitioner a requisite to jurisdiction, how can it make any difference whether the
detention is in no district rather than in a different district?").
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no way to read the text of § 2241 as anything other than an absolute
bar to federal court jurisdiction. Informed counsel, therefore,
might wisely have directed urgent petitions, especially from unsym-
pathetic petitioners who mere months ago had been waging war
against the United States, to the High Court, where a different
calculus of territorial jurisdiction might prevail. 70
But the Supreme Court gave habeas petitions filed from over-
seas a cold welcome. The first set of petitions were filed by Ameri-
can citizens, including both civilians and enlisted personnel. Leave
to file the petitions was denied in a curt order denominated Ex parte
Betz that pointed solely to the "want of original jurisdiction."71 Sub-
sequent petitions from non-American petitioners fared little better.
They were dismissed with cursory orders with Justice RobertJackson
(formerly chief prosecutor at Ndirnberg) not participating. 72
Hirota, joined by other petitioners convicted by the IMTFE,
broke through this impasse. Professor Stephen Vladeck explains in
a recent article how Justices Rutledge and Jackson were together
responsible, perhaps inadvertently, for Hirota's unusual procedural
turn. As Vladeck explains, Hirota's petition raised questions about
the jurisdiction of the IMTFE and General MacArthur's actions "in
accepting an office, title and place of trust from ten (10) foreign
governments without consent of the Congress. ... "73 According to
Vladeck, an angry draft dissent by Justice Rutledge focused on these
unusual separation of powers issues.74 The possibility of public dis-
sention from within the Court against official policy may have
forced Justice Jackson's hand (Jackson had until then recused him-
70. But as early as May 1949, the Supreme Court signaled that Ahrens was not
the impermeable barrier Fairman thought. In the Bush case, the Court dismissed
the original habeas petition of a U.S. serviceman detained in Japan "without
prejudice to the right to apply to any appropriate court that may have jurisdiction."
In re Bush, 336 U.S. 971, 971 (1949). The petitioner took the hint. So did the
District Court for the District of Columbia, which exercised jurisdiction over the
petition. In re Bush, 84 F. Supp. 873 (D.D.C. 1949).
71. See Fairman, supra note 65, at 592; Ex parte Betz, 329 U.S. 672 (1946).
Justices Black and Rutledge indicated that the petition ought to have been denied
"without prejudice to [it] being filed in the appropriate District Court," id., a
course later adopted in the Bush case. In re Bush, 336 U.S. at 971.
72. See, e.g., In re Dammann, 336 U.S. 922 (1949); Everett v. Truman, 334 U.S.
824 (1948).
73. Hirota Brief, supra note 58, at 27. Hirota also emphasized that the IMTFE
departed from "basic, essential and fundamental rules of evidence, procedure and
trial ... ." Id. at 30.
74. Vladeck, supra note 13, at 20-21.
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self from war crimes cases); the former war crimes prosecutor voted
to set the case for oral argument.75
The Supreme Court heard arguments on December 16 and 17,
1948, a Thursday and a Friday. On Monday, December 20, five Jus-
tices issued a three paragraph, nine-sentence, citation-free per
curiam opinion, denying the motions for leave to file habeas peti-
tions. Justice Rutledge did not vote and passed away shortly there-
after, Justice Murphy dissented without opinion, and Justice
Jackson took no part in the merits decision.7 6 The per curiam
opinion's entire reasoning was as follows:
The petitioners, all residents and citizens of Japan, are being
held in custody pursuant to the judgments of a military tribu-
nal in Japan .... We are satisfied that the tribunal sentencing
these petitioners is not a tribunal of the United States. The
United States and other allied countries conquered and now
occupy and control Japan. General Douglas MacArthur has
been selected and is acting as the Supreme Commander for
the Allied Powers. The military tribunal sentencing these peti-
tioners has been set up by General MacArthur as the agent of
the Allied Powers. Under the foregoing circumstances the
courts of the United States have no power or authority to re-
view, to affirm, set aside or annul the judgments and sentences
imposed on these petitioners and for this reason the motions
for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus are denied.77
In the early morning of December 23, Hirota and two other men
were executed in Japan. 78 Ten days later, Hirota's petition for re-
hearing was denied.
Six months later, Douglas filed a more substantial concurrence
in the judgment. In principal part, he addressed two issues. First,
he rejected the idea that Ahrens compelled the conclusion that stat-
utory jurisdiction was wanting when a petitioner was detained
outside the United States. On this question, Ahrens' author pre-
dicted "grave and alarming consequences" if a U.S. citizen could be
detained overseas and convicted in a military court with no judicial
oversight.79 By that time, as Douglas noted, the Court had already
begun to indicate that citizens held overseas could file petitions for
habeas review.8°1 The second matter Justice Douglas addressed was
75. Id.
76. Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 198-99 (1948) (per curiam).
77. Id. at 198.
78. SHIROYAMA, supra note 61, at 297-98.
79. Hirota, 338 U.S. at 201-02 (Douglas, J., concurring).
80. See In re Bush, 336 U.S. 971, 971 (1949).
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whether "[t]he fact that the tribunal had been set up by the Allied
Powers should not of itself preclude [judicial] inquiry." In Doug-
las's view:
If an American General holds a prisoner, our process can
reach him wherever he is. To that extent at least, the Constitu-
tion follows the flag. It is no defense for him to say that he acts
for the Allied Powers. He is an American citizen who is per-
forming functions for our government. It is our Constitution
which he supports and defends. If there is evasion or violation
of its obligations, it is no defense that he acts for another na-
tion. There is at present no group or confederation to which
an official of this Nation owes a higher obligation than he owes
to us.8 1
In an almost throwaway sentence at the end of his concurrence,
Justice Douglas asserted, in stark contrast to everything that had
come before, that establishment of the IMTFE was a "political" deci-
sion shielded from judicial review,82 hence obviating the need to
consider whether the Court had erred by letting the petitioners'
executions proceed. This post hoc explanation is in some tension
with Douglas's other arguments, and the concurring opinion does
not explore whether application of the political question doctrine
would extend equally to citizens' petitions. Whatever its strengths
(including its accurate forecast of Ahrens' scope), Justice Douglas's
concurrence does not provide a wholly satisfying resolution of
Hirota's logic. 8 3
Its reasoning charred by a literal rush to judgment, the Hirota
per curiam opinion bears comparison to the Court's hasty and re-
sults-orientated decision in Ex parte Quiin,8 4 a case that Justice
Scalia described with uncharacteristic understatement as "not this
Court's finest hour."8 5 Quirin endorsed the hasty, secretive trial by
military commission of a group of alleged Nazi saboteurs captured
along the eastern seaboard in 1941.86 Yet, like Quirin, Hirota today
assumes new significance as the Government attempts to carve out
new zones of conduct free from judicial oversight. Indeed, Hirota is
81. Hirota, 338 U.S. at 204 (Douglas, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 208-09.
83. Jeffrey Rosen has commented on Justice Douglas's "erratic" conduct in
other, contemporaneous circumstances. See JEFFREY ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT:
THE PERSONALITIES AND RIVALRIES THAT DEFINED AMERICA 150-53 (2007).
84. 317 U.S. 1 (1942); see generally Louis FISHER, NAzi SABOTEURS ON TRIAL: A
MILITARY TRIBUNAL AND AMERICAN LAW 87-126 (2003).
85. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 569 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86. See generally FISHER, supra note 84, at 87-126.
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just the latest in a sequence of post-World War II cases, including
Quiin and Johnson v. Eisentrager,8 7 that have been staples in Govern-
ment briefs. It is perhaps ironic that post-war cases concerning jus-
tice for Nazis that were easy in their day (because of the clear
balance of equities then) have become the difficult precedent for
the counter-terrorism adjudications of today.
B. Hirota and the Supreme Court's Appellate Jurisdiction
The Hirota Court defined the pivotal question in the case
before it as whether the Supreme Court had "power or authority to
review, to affirm, set aside or annul the judgments and sentences
imposed on these petitioners." 88 In other words, it homed in on
the appellate nature of the task at hand and the character of the
judgments that Hirota and his co-petitioners sought to challenge in
federal court. The first two paragraphs of the decision list factors
that could potentially be relevant to the outcome, but the subse-
quent text narrows in on the nature of the "tribunal sentencing
these petitioners. '89 This focus on the nature of the appellate re-
view sought is understandable for a simple reason: the Supreme
Court's power to provide relief-which was the sole jurisdictional
question presented by the case because Hirota had chosen to
forego lower court review-rested in the first instance on whether
the high court had appellate jurisdiction under Article III of the
Constitution. Under well-established case law, the Court lacked
such power. This simple but oft-forgotten rule of decision com-
prises and exhausts Hirota's holding.
The explanation of this point sheds rewarding light on the
nebulous Hirota decision. In light of the Government's recent ag-
gressive use of Hirota, it merits detailed exposition.
The Supreme Court, under Article III, has two kinds of juris-
diction: original and appellate. Article III defines the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction in exclusive terms. That Congress can-
not add to this jurisdiction has been clear since Marbury.90 Article
87. 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (concluding that the federal courts lacked jurisdic-
tion over collateral challenges filed by convicted German war criminals held in the
Landsberg prison in occupied Germany).
88. Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 198 (1948) (per curiam).
89. Id.
90. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175-76 (1803) (noting that
Article IllI's original jurisdiction is exclusive). There are arguments that this aspect
of Marbury is wrong. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi and Gary Lawson, The Unitay
Executive:Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Reponse tojus-
tice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1002, 1036-42 (2007).
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III also states that the Court's appellate jurisdiction depends wholly
on "such regulations as the Congress shall make."9'
The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as defined by
Article III does not explicitly include the power to issue writs of
habeas corpus. Original jurisdiction under Article III over a habeas
writ is thus rare, available only when the action falls into one of the
limited set of categories-such as "cases affecting ambassadors,
public ministers and consuls, and [other] cases in which a State is a
party"-enumerated in Article 111.92 Accordingly, the exercise of
Supreme Court jurisdiction over a habeas proceeding has generally
been an exercise of appellate power over another tribunal's deci-
sion. In Bollman, Chief Justice Marshall thus explained that "[t] he
decision that the individual shall be imprisoned must always pre-
cede the application for a writ of habeas corpus, and this writ must
always be for the purpose of revising that decision, and therefore
[is] appellate in its nature.."9 3
Nevertheless, a habeas petition filed in the first instance in the
Supreme Court "is commonly understood to be 'original' in the
sense of being filed in the first instance in [the Supreme] Court,
but nonetheless for constitutional purposes [is] an exercise of th [e]
Court's appellate (rather than original) jurisdiction."9 4 Hirota's pe-
tition was thus "original," in the sense that it had not been filed in a
lower federal court, but "appellate" in the sense that it sought to
invoke the appellate (and not the original) jurisdiction component
of Article III.
Compounding the nomenclatural confusion, a district court
exercises original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 over a habeas
petition filed to challenge imprisonment without any judicial pro-
cess .9 5 In short, whether a habeas petition seeks to invoke "appel-
91. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; see also Marbury, 5 U.S. at 175-76.
92. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 374-75 (1879); see generally Ex parte Hung
Hang, 108 U.S. 552 (1883).
93. Exparte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 101 (1807) (emphasis added).
94. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 667 n.1 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring); see
generally Dallin H. Oaks, The "Original" Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Supreme Court,
1962 Sup. CT. REV. 153, 154-62.
95. See Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 96-97 (1868) (noting the gap
between the Supreme Court's "appellate" habeas jurisdiction, and "that of the En-
glish courts," which "is original"); cf. Ex parte Hayes, 414 U.S. 1327, 1327-29 (1973)
(Douglas. J., in chambers) (transferring application for writ of habeas corpus of
American citizen in overseas military detention filed with Justice Douglas to the
District Court for the District of Columbia).
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late" or "original" jurisdiction in the first instance depends on the
character of the tribunal being petitioned.9 6
Hirota's petitions, filed first in the Supreme Court, could have
been only an exercise of Article III appellatejurisdiction because the
Hirota petitioners could not lodge themselves within any of Article
III's grants of original jurisdiction. This is why the nature of the
IMTFE was pivotal to the per curiam decision: the "essential crite-
rion of appellate jurisdiction, [is] that it revises and corrects the
proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that
cause."9 7 There must be some exercise of the 'judicial power" as it
is defined in the U.S. Constitution to superintend.98
Precedent on precisely what constitutes an exercise of the 'ju-
dicial power" is scattered and unclear. By 1948, a couple of data
points were available. In 1863, in Ex parte Vallandingham, the Court
held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of a mili-
tary commission within the United States. 99 In Ex parte Yerger, how-
ever, the Court found appellate jurisdiction to review a specific
military commission conviction because "a Circuit Court of the
United States ha[d], in the exercise of its original jurisdiction,
caused a prisoner to be brought before it, and ha[d] after in-
quir[ed] into the cause of detention"-even though it declined to
issue the writ. 100 The contrast between Vallandingham and Yerger-
whether or not a lower court had, however fleetingly, examined the
habeas petition-suggests a petitioner seeking to invoke Article III
original jurisdiction has merely to touch first base in an inferior
district court in order to satisfy the constitutional jurisdictional
minimum.
The Hirota Court also had more recent guidance at hand. In
1943, the Court exercised appellate jurisdiction over a judgment
96. Francis Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Copus, 1970 DuKE L.J. 605,
637 (1970) ("[S]ection 14 [of the 1789 Judiciary Act] makes no distinction in
terms of original and appellate jurisdiction .... [T]he grant [of habeas jurisdic-
tion] to the district court, where thejurisdiction could be only original, is included
in the very same words."); accord Edward A. Hartnett, The Constitutional Puzzle of
Habeas Corpus, 46 B.C. L. REv. 251, 283 (2005).
97. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175 (1803); see alsoJames E.
Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court's Power to Supervise Inferior Tribu-
nals, 78 TEX. L. REv. 1433, 1465-66 (2000) (explaining that petitioners must sue in
inferior federal tribunals before obtaining review in the High Court).
98. See In re Sanborn, 148 U.S. 222, 224 (1893).
99. See Ex parte Vallandingham, 68 U.S. 243, 253-54 (1863) (concluding that
the Supreme Court could not exercise appellate jurisdiction over a direct appeal
from a military commission).
100. Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 103.
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from the Supreme Court of the Philippines. 10 1 And in Quiin, the
challenge to the World War II military tribunals for Nazi saboteurs,
a lower court denied the writ, creating a decision that could be re-
viewed by the Supreme Court in accord with Yerger.102 Subse-
quently, the Court would also exercise appellate jurisdiction over
the non-Article III United States Court of Military Appeals without
comment on the jurisdictional issue.10 3
To be sure, the exact metes and bounds of High Court "appel-
late" jurisdiction, particularly in relation to military and territorial
tribunals, remains incompletely theorized. Nevertheless, it was
clear by 1948 that the IMTFE was not an exercise of the 'judicial
power" amenable to "appellate" review, and that Hirota and his co-
petitioners sought "a forbidden exercise of its original jurisdic-
tion.' 0 4 To be sure, the United States had a substantial role in the
creation of the IMTFE.' 0 5 But like the commission being chal-
101. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). On a petition for certiorari, the
Court initially issued a stay on Yamashita's behalf after the Philippine Court pro-
ceedings had run its course. In reYamashita, 326 U.S. 693, 693 (1945); see generally
Alpheus Thomas Mason, Inter Arma Silent Leges: ChiefJustice Stone's Views, 69 HARv.
L. REv. 806, 831-38 (1956). This was, of course, not the first Supreme Court case
that originated in the Philippine judicial system. See also Dorr v. United States, 195
U.S. 138, 149 (1904) (holding that there was no right to ajury trial in the Philip-
pine courts). Rather oddly, it has long been clear that territorial courts do not
exercise the "judicial power." In 1828, ChiefJustice Marshall stated that the "juris-
diction with which they [in the case at bar, a territorial court in Florida] are in-
vested, is not a part of the judicial power which is defined in the 3d article of the
Constitution, but is conferred by Congress, in the execution of those general pow-
ers which that body possesses over the territories of the United States." American
Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828). Uncertainty as to
the precise bounds of Article III judicial power with respect to territorial courts
does not equate to uncertainty with regard to a non-U.S. military tribunal.
102. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 2; accord Ex pane Siebold, 100 U.S. at 374-75; Oaks,
supra note 94, at 161-71.
103. See, e.g., Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
104. See James E. Pfander, The Limits of Habeas Jurisdiction and the Global War on
Terror, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 497, 517 (2006).
105. Alison Marston Danner, Beyond the Geneva Conventions: Lessons from the
Tokyo Tribunal in Prosecuting War and Terrorism, 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 83, 88-89 (2005)
("The United States dominated all aspects of the IMTFE. Unlike the [post-war
tribunal in Germany], the Tokyo Tribunal was not established by an international
agreement hammered out by the victorious Allies. General Douglas MacArthur,
the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in the Pacific, unilaterally estab-
lished the IMTFE on January 19, 1946. At the same time, he promulgated its
Charter, which had been written largely by U.S. officials and which set out the law
that would be applied during its proceedings."); accord BALL, supra note 62, at 77.
However debatable the Hirota court's description of the IMTFE might have been,
its jurisdictional disposition nonetheless is wholly defensible on the basis of the
limits on Article III jurisdiction.
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lenged in Vallandingham, that body was military in nature, and as a
military entity, Vallandingham forbade review. And because Hirota
and his co-petitioner had not touched first base as the Yerger peti-
tioners had-due to the Ahrens rule-their motions for leave to file
could be rejected in short order.1 0 6
The Justices were clearly aware of this limit on their power to
adjudicate cases, because they applied it strictly both before and
after Hirota. Two years before Hirota, the Court denied petitions
from American citizens in Betz "for want of original jurisdiction."' 0 7
The Court declined to adopt the suggestion from Justices Black and
Rutledge to indicate that re-filing in a district court was permissible.
And in both the Everett case (decided seven months before Hirota)
and the Dammann case (decided four months after Hirota), the
Court dismissed petitions from petitioners similarly situated to
Hirota, with four Justices invoking the provision of Article III that
defined the Supreme Court's original and appellate jurisdiction. 10s
That is, four of the five Justices who composed the Hirota majority
believed that no Supreme Court appellate or original jurisdiction
existed at all in circumstances such as those presented in Hirota.0 9
The other dissenting Justices did not explain what action they
wanted, but later cases made plain that a petition incorrectly filed
in the Supreme Court could be dismissed without prejudice for re-
filing in the appropriate district court. 10
In sum, Hirota was decided against the backdrop of a clear ju-
risdictional bar that had been invoked since Bolman in 1807. This
bar squarely applied to Hirota's request for collateral review of a
final judgment of a military commission staffed by foreign
judges.1" This same bar was enforced mere months before and
106. Hirota and his co-petitioners, in other words, were caught in ajurisdic-
tional Catch-22 caused in the immediate term by an expansive reading of Ahrens.
107. Ex parte Betz, 329 U.S. 672, 672 (1946).
108. In re Dammann, 336 U.S. 922 (1949); Everett v. Truman, 334 U.S. 824
(1948); see generally Pfander, supra note 104, at 517 nn.131-32. In dismissing these
cases, the Court did not adopt a standard form order; its orders in different cases
use different one-sentence formulations. The fact that the Hirota Court used nine
sentences to accomplish what could have been done in one does not supply a
reason to infer some additional reason for the dismissal: Hirota, after all, differed
from the other cases in having proceeded to oral argument before dismissal,
109. The mystery here is Justice Black, who voted with the majority in Hirota
and then with the dissenters in Everett and Dammann.
110. See infra notes 70-71.
111. The fact that Hirota attacked the jurisdiction of the IMTFE as well as the
substantive fairness of his conviction-a challenge that was traditionally the sole
ground for review in a collateral challenge to a military tribunal's judgment-is of
no relevance on this point. See generally Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65
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again mere months after the Hirota per curiam opinion issued,
making it clear that the Justices were well aware of their obligation
to examine the Article III bonafides of habeas petitions filed in the
first instance in the High Court.
C. Hirota's Dicta and Flick
The Hirota Court did not merely answer the case before it; it
also included dicta concerning the "power or authority" of all the
lower federal courts. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit in Flick v. Johnson took the position that
no habeas jurisdiction availed when a non-citizen sought habeas re-
view of the final judgment of an international military tribunal in a
federal district court.112 In Flick, a German national challenged a
judgment of a military commission convened in Germany. The Cir-
cuit Court held that the dispositive question under Hirota was "the
source" of the commission's "power" and "whether it was a court of
the United States." 113 The Court of Appeals concluded that the tri-
bunal that had sentenced Flick, while convened by a U.S. officer,
was nonetheless non-U.S. in character because its "power and juris-
diction arose out of thejoint sovereignty of the Four victorious Pow-
ers," and so dismissed the petition.1 14  The Flick Court's
characterization of the military commission at issue has been
roundly criticized. 115 More relevant here is the question whether
flick's analytic framework, and its reading of Hirota, is persuasive.
Flick's reasoning is not persuasive because the binding jurisdic-
tional bar that dictated dismissal in Hirota has no application to fed-
eral courts of first instance. By extending the Hirota holding to the
lower court context, the D.C. Circuit may have eased the case man-
agement problems presented by the influx of war-time prisoner
cases, but it also broadened the Hirota holding beyond its tenable
bounds.
Extension of Hirota is easy to understand under the circum-
stances in which Flick arose. The Hirota Court did not disaggregate
(1858); William F. Fratcher, Review by the Civil Courts ofJudgments of Federal Military
Tribunals, 10 OHIO ST. L.J. 271 (1949).
112. 174 F.2d 983, 984, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
113. Id. at 984.
114. Id. at 985.
115. See Note, Habeas Corpus Protection Against Illegal Extraterritorial Detention, 51
COLUM. L. REV. 368, 369 n.5 (1951) [hereinafter COLUMBIA Note]; see also Note,
Review of International Criminal Convictions, 59 YALE L.J. 997, 999 n.3, 1001 n.12,
1003 (1949-50) (describing mixed U.S. and international authority for the court in
Hlick).
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clearly which of the "circumstances" that the Court listed in the first
two paragraphs of its decision best explained the jurisdictional
holding, and it spoke about it as a bar on the (plural) "courts." Nor
did it explain whether its ruling found footing on statutory grounds
(as Ahrens did) or on a more nebulous constitutional limit to the
'Judicial Power" defined in Article III. And, compared to the Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court,judges of the D.C. Circuit may have had
less reason to be familiar with the intricacies of the appellate/origi-
nal distinction drawn by Article III.
The dicta about all federal courts in Hirota can, in any case, be
explained in more tailored terms that are fully consonant with the
jurisdictional principles then in play. The Hirota per curiam came
hard on the heels of Ahrens, which seemed to limit statutory juris-
diction over petitions filed from overseas. The dicta in Hirota on
which Flick rested can be better read as conveying the implication
that Ahrens's holding indeed extended to extraterritorial deten-
tions. Justice Douglas certainly read the Hirota dicta in this way,
and protested at his inchoate majority opinion in Ahrens being ex-
tended beyond its function as an inter-district allocative tool.' 16
This extension would not have been as surprising in 1949 as it
is today. The idea that federal courts wholly lacked power in rela-
tion to extraterritorial detention decisions, even concerning U.S.
citizens, was not an outlandish reading of the then-relevant prece-
dent. Supreme Court precedent suggested that no extraterritorial
jurisdiction for citizens existed.' 1 7 Both commentators and advo-
cates saw colorable arguments for refusing any exercise of habeas
jurisdiction beyond U.S. borders. Two years after Hirota, one com-
mentator observed that a "writ of habeas corpus has never issued
from a court of the United States on the petition of anyone, citizen
or alien, held in American custody beyond the territorial limits of
the United States.""1 8 And in 1950, the Solicitor General in Eisen-
trager argued strenuously that federal courts entirely lacked habeas
jurisdiction over challenges to either citizen or non-citizen
detention. 19
116. Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1948) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring) (Douglas' concurrence was filed in 1949, six months after the per curium
decision was issued). This was also the probable reason why Hirota did not, like
the Bush petitioners a year later, simply refile in a federal district court.
117. See, e.g., In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891) (authorizing trial by consular
court).
118. COLUMBIA Note, supra note 115, at 368.
119. See Brief for Petitioners at 14, Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763
(1950) (No. 306).
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The Flick decision, moreover, arose against a sui generisjurisdic-
tional backdrop that existed for only a short window of time. On
the one hand, it appeared at that moment the federal courts lacked
any statutory jurisdiction over petitions challenging extraterritorial
detention under Ahrens. But even as the Flick case was sub judice,
the D.C. Circuit Court was hotly debating the scope of habeas juris-
diction compelled by the Constitution. Less than a month before
Flick, a different panel of the D.C. Circuit handed down a decision
in Eisentrager v. Forrestal, holding that although Ahrens had fore-
closed statutory extraterritorial jurisdiction, the federal court's
power to entertain a petition from German prisoners detained at
the Landberg Prison in Germany could be derived "directly from
fundamentals," that is, from the Constitution itself.120 In other
words, between April 1949 and June 1950 (when the Supreme
Court reversed the D.C. Circuit in its Eisentrager decision). 21 fed-
eral courts read the habeas statute to grant no extraterritorial juris-
diction, but read the Constitution to require some jurisdiction
beyond this statutory grant. For the Flick Court, therefore, the
question presented was the outer boundary of the Constitution's
distribution of habeas rights to non-citizens outside the United
States. 122 The question before the Flick case was how far the Consti-
tution must extend-and not where it must stop; Flick thus concerned
the scope of a constitutional entitlement, and not a question of bar-
riers to jurisdiction.
The D.C. Circuit's opinion in Eisentrager v. Forrestal'23 thus was
a crucial part of the jurisdictional landscape when Flick was de-
cided, less than a month later. 124 In this light, Flick and Eisentrager
are best seen as companion cases presenting variants on the issue of
the limits to the constitutionally compelled availability of collateral
review for a narrow class of non-citizens detained overseas in the
aftermath of a world war. Tellingly, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Eisentrager and denied certiorari in Flick on the same
day, November 14, 1949.125
120. Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 963, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd sub
nom. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
121. SeeJohnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
122. Today, that question of constitutional entitlement is answered in a differ-
ent register than the obdurate terms Justice Jackson invoked in Eisentrager. See
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483 n.15 (2004).
123. 174 F.2d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
124. One of thejudges who sat on the Eisentrager panel indeed wrote the Flick
opinion. Compare id. with Flick v. Johnson 174 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
125. I'm grateful to Steve Vladeck for pointing this out to me.
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The Supreme Court's Eisentrager opinion no longer stands as
an absolute limit to federal court jurisdiction over foreign-filed
habeas petitions. As the Supreme Court explained in Rasul, "Bra-
den overruled the statutory predicate to Eisentrager's holding, [and
thus] Eisentrager plainly does not preclude the exercise of § 2241
jurisdiction over" petitions filed for overseas detainees. 126 Like
Eisentrager, Flick has been deprived of its "statutory predicate"; it is
no longer the case that a court must inquire into the availability of
constitutional habeas jurisdiction for petitions from U.S. citizens
filed from overseas. This much has been clear since Eisentrager,
which waxed lyrically that "[c] itizenship as a head of jurisdiction
and a ground of protection was old when Paul invoked it in his
appeal to Caesar."12 7 Extraterritorial statutory habeas jurisdiction
has been exercised on behalf of citizens since Burns v. Wilson, 128
and at least in some instances for non-citizens since Rasul 1 29 In
this regard, Flick's use of Hirota to limit constitutional habeas has
little practical consequence today.
Subsequent precedent supports this reading of Flick. In 1955,
the Circuit Court in United States ex rel. Keefe v. Dulles examined a
habeas petition from a U.S. citizen detained in France pursuant to a
final criminal conviction from a French court.1 30 Rather than in-
voking Flick, the Court reviewed the petition and concluded that it
did not state a claim on its face because it did not allege U.S. "cus-
tody."1 31 That is, the Court passed beyond the jurisdictional thresh-
old and looked at the statutory prerequisites for habeas jurisdiction.
Further undermining the continuing validity of Flick, the Court
conducted a merits inquiry into whether it should issue a writ of
mandamus, finally concluding that no such remedy was war-
126. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 479.
127. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769 (1950).
128. See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 138-39 (1953).
129. But see Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, §7, 120
Stat. 2600 (2006) (limiting the availability of habeas for certain classes of non-
citizens).
130. United States ex rel. Keefe v. Dulles, 222 F.2d 390, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1955)
(exercising habeas jurisdiction but denying the writ, when petitioner, detained by
French government, could not show constitutional rights violated by U.S. action);
accord Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28, 56-57 (D.D.C. 2004); see also Duchow
v. United States, No. 95-2121, 1995 WL 425037, at *3 (E.D. La. July 19, 1995) (to
determine if petitioner was in U.S. "custody" while on trial in Bolivia, court in-
quired whether "the Bolivian government is acting as a mere 'puppet' of the
United States.").
131. Keefe, 222 F.2d at 392.
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ranted.1 32 Seventeen years later, the Court of Appeals exercised
merits jurisdiction a second time in a case involving petitioners who
had been already convicted in a non-U.S. tribunal and who chal-
lenged their transfer to another sovereign. 33 These cases are am-
ple demonstration of Flick's limited salience today.
III.
FURTHER EVIDENCE FOR HIROTA'S
LIMITED REACH
Three categories of extrinsic evidence of Hirota's circum-
scribed reach further undercut the ambitious reading of that deci-
sion attempted by the Government: first, the federal courts'
treatment of other habeas petitions from the context of multina-
tional military operations; second, post-1948 developments in the
"state action" doctrine; and, finally and perhaps most fundamen-
tally, the constitutional architecture of the separation of powers.
A. Judicial Treatment of International Auspices: 1952-2004
Between 1952 and 2004, the Supreme Court took jurisdiction
of numerous habeas petitions from American citizens detained in
U.S. military operations with multinational or U.N. complexions.
Three cases in particular cast into doubt any reading of Hirota that
finds a jurisdictional bar beyond its narrow holding.
First, Madsen v. Kinsella concerned Yvette Madsen, a U.S. citi-
zen and civilian who committed homicide in occupied Germany in
October 1949.134 She was tried and sentenced by the "United
132. Id. at 394. In another set of cases, courts have examined habeas chal-
lenges to confinement on U.S. soil based on a foreign judgment. See, e.g., Bishop
v. Reno, 210 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2000); Pfeifer v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 615 F.2d
873 (9th Cir. 1980). Bishop and Pfeifer involve persons tried and sentenced for a
criminal offense in another country. Under treaties and implementing legislation,
both detainees were brought to the United States. In both cases, the detainees
received a U.S. court hearing in which they voluntarily waived the right to chal-
lenge their sentences. Courts upheld this consensual arrangement, which had
been conducted pursuant to a carefully negotiated treaty and under the close su-
pervision of the federal judiciary. See Bishop, 210 F.3d at 1296-97; Pfeifer, 615 F.2d
at 877. In both cases, the court examined closely the facts of the case, and the
Pfeifer court closely looked at the factual question of whether the consent was vol-
untary. Id. The presence of an anterior foreign judgment did not strip the courts
of jurisdiction.
133. See Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1212, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (review-
ing contemplated transfer of American servicemen to West Germany following
conviction there, and concluding transfer was "the precise response required of
the United States by its treaty commitments ... .
134. 343 U.S. 341, 342-43 (1952).
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States Court of the Allied High Commission for Germany," which
was established for the American zone of occupied Germany by a
law promulgated by the "Allied High Command."'13 5 The Supreme
Court addressed and decided the question of whether this tribunal
had jurisdiction over Madsen, or whether courts-martial were the
proper forum for adjudication of her offense. The Court con-
cluded that the tribunal had plenary authority to try Madsen under
the Articles of War.136
Without question, the tribunal that convicted Madsen had au-
thority under U.S. law. Yet it also traced roots back to a multi-na-
tional arrangement. After the German surrender in May 1945, the
four Allied powers declared their supreme authority in Germany
and agreed that "authority was to be wielded unilaterally by the
Commanders-in-Chief in their respective zones of occupa-
tion .... -137 In April 1944, the Combined Chiefs of Staff directed
U.S. General Dwight Eisenhower "as Supreme Commander of the
Allied Expeditionary Force" to establish tribunals for occupied Ger-
many. 138 Entering Germany in September 1944, Eisenhower issued
proclamations suspending operation of German courts and estab-
lishing new tribunals under the Allied forces.' 3 9 In his capacity as
"Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force," Eisenhower is-
sued Ordinance No. 2 establishing military occupation courts. 140
In short, the post-war occupation Allied regime for Germany was an
135. Id. at 343-44 & n.3.
136. Id. at 353-54 (finding concurrentjurisdiction).
137. ELMER PLISCHKE, HISTORY OF THE ALLIED HIGH COMMISSION FOR GER-
MANY: ITS ESTABLISHMENT, STRUCTURE AND PROCEDURES 1 (1951). This division of
authority was confirmed by an agreement reached at the Potsdam conference in
August 1945. See The Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, July 17-August 2, 1945: (a)
Protocol of Proceedings, Aug. 1, 1945, reprinted in DEP'T OF STATE, A DECADE OF
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLicY DOCUMENTS, 1941-1949 28, 30 (1985). The four Allied
powers were the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet
Union. See W. FRIEDMANN, THE ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY 70-99
(1947).
138. See Eli E. Nobleman, American Military Government Courts in Germany:
Their Role in the Democratization of the German People 43-44 (1950) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University School of Law) (on file with the
New York University School of Law Library); see also Eli E. Nobleman, Militay Gov-
ernment Courts: Law and Justice in the American Zone of Germany, 33 A.B.A.J. 777, 778-
79 (1947).
139. Nobleman, American Military Government Courts, supra note 138, at 48-
49. For more details of the courts thereby established, see John Raymond, Note,
Madsen v. Kinsella: Landmark and Guidepost in Law of Military Occupation, 47 Am. J.
INT'L L. 300, 300-02 (1953).
140. FRIEDMANN, supra note 137, at 300-03 (reproducing Ordinance No. 2).
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explicit compound of American and international authority. 14 1
Trying to classify the situation according to a binary of domestic/
international obscures the complex facts at stake. 142
From their inception therefore, occupation courts for post-war
Germany had an Allied, as well as an American, character. Even as
the United States promulgated regulations (published in the Fed-
eral Register) for the establishment, jurisdiction, and management
of courts in the U.S. zone, 143 occupation courts existed as a conse-
quence of the condominium arrangement between the three Allied
powers. Reflecting this complexity, the courts for the U.S. Zone
were formally titled "United States Courts of the Allied High Com-
mission for Germany" on April 7, 1950.144 Hence, from beginning
to end, courts in occupied Germany kept their allied, and not
merely American, character.
Second, the Court in United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles issued a
habeas writ for a prisoner detained in the course of American mili-
tary operations in Korea.145 Arrested in Pennsylvania after his dis-
charge from the service, the Toth petitioner was transferred back to
Korea where his alleged crime had occurred and where the court-
martial was to take place. 146 U.S. operations in the Korean conflict
were authorized by a U.N. resolution. 147 Under an expansive read-
ing of Hirota, the fact of U.N. authorization for the Korean action
141. For instance, the U.S. High Commission for Germany spoke of the "tri-
partite cooperation and fusion" involved in post-war governance. PLISCHKE, supra
note 137, at 9. This included creation of a multinational Allied High Commission
with substantial governance responsibilities. Id. at 9, 28-38.
142. See generally Stephen D. Krasner, The Hole in the Whole: Sovereignty, Shared
Sovereignty, and International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1075, 1091-100 (2004)
(describing models of "shared sovereignty" that involve "the engagement of exter-
nal actors in some of the domestic authority structures of the target state for an
indefinite period of time").
143. See Military Government for Germany; United States Zone, 12 Fed. Reg.
6997 (Oct. 29, 1947); Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 362 (1952).
144. Allied High Commission Documents, 15 Fed. Reg. 2086 (Apr. 13, 1950)
(emphasis added).
145. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
146. Id. at 13 & n.3.
147. See S.C. Res. 84, 3-5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/84 (July 7, 1950) ("3. Recom-
mends that all Members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to
the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance
available to a unified command under the United States of America; 4. Requests the
United States to designate the commander of such forces; 5. Authorizes the unified
command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of opera-
tions against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations
participating.... ."); see also S.C. Res. 83, U.N. Doc. S/RES/83 (June 27, 1950); MAX
HILAIRE, UNITED NATIONS LAW AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL 9, 186 (2005); Louis
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should have shielded detention and trial decisions from federal
court review. Clearly, it did not.
Finally, there is Hamdi. Yaser Hamdi was detained initially by
Afghan forces fighting for the Northern Alliance. 148 This is hardly
surprising since, as the State Department has explained of the U.S.
invasion of Afghanistan, "Operation Enduring Freedom... [was] a
multinational coalition military operation."' 49 In addition to the
multinational character of the Afghan operation, military opera-
tions west of the Durand line also benefited from the United Na-
tions' blessing.1 50 U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. John Negroponte
explained that U.S. forces in Afghanistan acted "in accordance with
the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence" granted
in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.15' After the close of initial mili-
tary operations, the continued U.S. presence in Afghanistan also
received further authorization from the U.N. Security Council. 152
In sum, the post-war history of the nation's international entan-
glements is free of any mention of Hirota as an exception to the
availability of habeas jurisdiction for those in U.S. custody.
B. Post-1948 Development of the "State Action" Doctrine
After Hirota, constitutional doctrine has evolved to make it
clear that the government cannot avoid the costs imposed by consti-
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 255 (2d ed. 1996)
(noting "unified command" of multinational forces).
148. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004) (O'Connor, J., plurality
opinion).
149. U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet, Operation Enduring Freedom (Jan.
31, 2006), www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/60083.htm (emphasis added); see also
Hamdi Brief, supra note 37, at 2-3, ("U.S. and coalition forces have removed the
Taliban from power..."); HenryJ. Perritt, Jr., Providing Judicial Review for Decisions
by Political Trustees, 15 DUKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 9 n.36 (2004) (describing the
"ad-hoc" international coalition that invaded Afghanistan).
150. See S.C. Res. 1707, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1707 (Sept. 12, 2006); see also
U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.4370 (Sept. 12, 2001); S.C.
Res. 1368, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001) (condemning the "horrify-
ing terrorist attacks which took place on 11 September 2001 in New York, Wash-
ington, D.C. and Pennsylvania").
151. ALEX CONTE, SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE UNITED NATIONS, AF-
GHANISTAN AND IRAQ 43 (2005); cf U.N. Charter art. 51, reprinted in THE CHARTER
OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY 788 (Bruno Simma ed., Oxford Press 2002).
152. See S.C. Res. 1378, 1 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1378 (Nov. 14, 2001) (calling
on U.N. member states to support the formation of a transition administration and
new government, including "quick impact" projects and long-term social and ez o-
nomic assistance).
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tutional norms by either collaboration with actors not directly cov-
ered by the Constitution or by assuming a new juridical form.
First crafted narrowly in The Civil Rights Cases, the "state action"
doctrine focused the application of constitutional norms on wholly
state actors, leaving non-state actors immune from constitutional
rules. 1 53 In 1948, the Supreme Court was only just developing rules
to regulate government collaboration with entities whose acts were
not directly regulated by the Constitution. 5 4 The landmark ruling
in Terry v. Adams and the development of rules to determine
whether "state action" was present all came after Hirota.155 In re-
cent years, this "state action" doctrinal framework has been ex-
tended to federal action. 156 There is lower court precedent,
moreover, for the proposition that "federal action" comprises ac-
tion by other governments at the behest of the U.S. government. In
one case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the
freezing of bank assets by the Swiss government at the request of
the American government met the state action standard. 57 And in
Abu Ali, the Saudi government's detention of a U.S. citizen at the
direction of the United States was treated as a matter subject to
habeas review. 158
This evolution of the "state action" doctrine follows Justice
Holmes's "bad man" theory of law,159 a theory with equal applica-
tion to the present international detention context. Despite its
name, this theory requires no assumptions about the good faith (or
153. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883).
154. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1946) (applying First
Amendment rules to company-owned town).
155. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1953) (striking down a purely
private association's primary election that excluded African-Americans); see gener-
ally G. Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State Action Doctrine: The Search
for Governmental Responsibility, 34 Hous. L. REv. 333, 424 (1997) (noting beginning
of "state action" doctrine).
156. See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 542
n.21 (1987) (describing federal action).
157. Barr v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 819 F.2d 25, 27-28 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding
"federal action" in Swiss government's freezing of bank deposits at U.S. request).
158. Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28, 59-60 (D.D.C. 2004) (U.S. does
not evade liability for constitutional violations by collaborating with foreign gov-
ernment); cf. Duchow v. United States, No. 95-2121, 1995 WL 425037, at *3 (E.D.
La., July 19, 1995) (to determine if petitioner was in U.S. "custody" in Bolivia,
court inquired whether "the Bolivian government is acting as a mere 'puppet' of
the United States.").
159. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457,
459 (1897) ("If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a
bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge
enables him to predict . . ").
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lack thereof) of actors subject to the law. Holmes made no claim
about the moral content of law. Rather, he attempted "to eliminate
a confusion within the concept of legal duty: a confusion between
reading moral words appearing in legal texts in their moral sense,
which suggests categorical obligations, and reading them in their
legal sense, which (Holmes claims) implies only disjunctive obliga-
tions."1 60 Rational, cost-minimizing government actors, in this
view, 16 1 will seek to avoid costly obligations. State action doctrine
simply accounts for this incentive by guarding against the displace-
ment of unconstitutional behavior into the hands of non-state
actors.
Courts explicitly endorse this logic in other applications of the
state action doctrine. Assessing the coverage of federal corpora-
tions such as Amtrak by constitutional norms (in particular the First
Amendment), Justice Scalia reasoned that "[i]t surely cannot be
that government, state or federal, is able to evade the most solemn
obligations imposed in the Constitution by simply resorting to the
corporate form." 6 2 More salient here, Justice O'Connor deployed
this same logic in Hamdi to caution against the crafting ofjurisdic-
tional lines that created incentives for circumvention. In her
Hamdi plurality, Justice O'Connor repudiated a place-of-confine-
ment limit for habeas jurisdiction that Justice Scalia intimated in
dissent. Her anti-circumvention reasoning is telling, and applies
with equal force to the question whether the U.S. military can es-
cape constitutional obligations through international entangle-
ments. Justice O'Connor explained that a territory rule would
"creat[e] a perverse incentive. Military authorities faced with the
stark choice of submitting to full-blown criminal process or releas-
ing a suspected enemy combatant captured on the battlefield will
simply keep citizen-detainees abroad." 63
160. David Luban, The Bad Man and the Good Lauyer, in THE PATH OF THE LAW
AND ITS INFLUENCE: THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 33, 40 (Steven J.
Burton ed., 2000).
161. I express no opinion as to whether the Holmesian view of legal duties is
correct, only that it underpins the development of state action doctrine.
162. Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 397 (1995).
163. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 524 (2004) (O'Connor, J., plurality
opinion); see also Developments in the Law-Remedies Against the United States and Its
Officials, 70 HARv. L. REv. 827, 868 (1957) ("The congressional policy that habeas
corpus should lie to challenge any illegal detention by a federal officer would be
frustrated by an interpretation that would deny the writ on the irrelevant basis of
the place of confinement, which can be changed almost at will by the officials
having custody of the prisoner.").
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Since World War II, the United States has operated as part of
multinational coalitions and under U.N. mandates as a matter of
routine. 164 Precisely the same concern about circumvention of con-
stitutional norms would be raised by a jurisdictional rule that de-
pended on the sign on the U.S. military post's front door. Its
inevitable consequence would be increased government use of
"multinational" condominiums to shield controversial detention
decisions from judicial scrutiny. Yet there is no support in case law
for the proposition that an executive agreement can abrogate con-
stitutional norms of personal liberty. Indeed, "[t]here is nothing in
[the Supremacy Clause] which intimates that treaties and laws en-
acted pursuant to them do not have to comply with the provisions
of the Constitution."'165
The historical roots of habeas provide further support for this
idea. At common law, a court's power to issue a writ of habeas
corpus turned on whether the crown exercised sufficient power and
control to secure obedience to the writ's command. 66 Reflecting
the writ's ultimately pragmatic remedial ends, British courts recog-
nized that if "an alternative forum did not exist, adjudication by the
superior courts at Westminster was seen as essential to prevent a
failure ofjustice."' 67 Hence, habeas has never been a matter of for-
malistic labels, but a deeply pragmatic inquiry into which actor was
making detention decisions. Like state action doctrine, this prag-
matic inquiry means that government action cannot be sheltered
under a formalistic label of non-state action to prevent exercise of
jurisdiction. This same anti-circumvention logic is a quality both of
habeas jurisdiction and of the judicial review of other governmental
action more generally.
164. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
165. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (Black, J., plurality opinion); accord Ge-
ofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890) (rejecting the idea that a treaty can "au-
thorize what the constitution forbids").
166. See, e.g., King v. Cowle, 97 Eng. Rep. 587, 599 (K.B. 1759) (there is "no
doubt as to the power [of the court]" to issue writs of habeas corpus "where the
place is under the subjection of the Crown of England . . . .") (emphasis added).
167. Pfander, supra note 104, at 511; see also Fabrigas v. Mostyn, 20 Howell's St.
Tr. 81, 231 (K-B. 1775) (sustaining action by alien from military colony of Minorca
for false imprisonment and banishment without trial; explaining that "to lay down
in an English court ofjustice such monstrous propositions as that a governor...
can do what he pleases... and is accountable to nobody-is a doctrine not to be
maintained; for if he is not accountable in this court, he is accountable no-
where.").
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C. Separation of Powers Principles
Finally, the Hirota gambit sits uncomfortably with the Constitu-
tion's separation of powers. The inevitable logic of reading Hirota
as the Justice Department has is to carve an open-ended exception
to habeas jurisdiction whenever the United States, by executive
agreement, enters an accord with a foreign sovereign. Congress,
therefore, need not have a role in the matter.
But the separation of powers aims, as James Madison ex-
plained, to prevent "[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative,
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands." 68 This limited govern-
ment principle finds embodiment in the Habeas Suspension
Clause, which on its face restricts the circumstances in which the
writ may be rendered unavailable. 169 The Suspension Clause argua-
bly contains a second constraint-assigning the decision to with-
draw judicial remedies for unlawful detention to Congress and
Congress alone. The Supreme Court, to be sure, has never held as
much. But a two-hundred-year old line of cases, linking Chief Jus-
tice John Marshall to the members of the 2006 Court, supports this
proposition. In the Boilman case, which arose out of the Aaron
Burr conspiracy, Marshall referred in dicta to the fact that "it is for
the legislature" to suspend habeas (as if that proposition needed no
further proof).1 70 And in the Hamdi case, eight of nine justices in-
dicated that the Suspension Power lay with Congress. 17' A constitu-
168. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
169. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, ci. 2.
170. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 101 (1807) ("If at any time the
public safety should require the suspension [of habeas], it is for the legislature to
say so."); see also Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 149 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No.
9487) ("The only power, therefore, which the president possesses, where the 'life,
liberty or property' of a private citizen is concerned, is the power and duty pre-
scribed in the third section of the second article, which requires 'that he shall take
care that the laws shall be faithfully executed."'). Of course, Lincoln declined to
obey the writ issued by ChiefJustice Taney in Merryman. MARK NEELY, THE FATE OF
LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 10 (1991).
171. "[U]nless Congress acts to suspend it, the Great Writ of habeas corpus
allows the Judicial Branch to play a necessary role in maintaining th[e] delicate
balance of governance, serving as an important judicial check on the Executive's
discretion in the realm of detentions." Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536
(2004) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion); see id. at 545 (Souter, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment) (noting "the need for an
assessment by Congress before citizens are subject to lockup"); id. at 562 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (stating that this Congressional assessment has historically been sought
and obtained).
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tional point so long treated as self-evident should not be lightly
dismissed.
Nor does the involvement of the executive branch (by entering
multinational agreements with foreign powers) suffice to quell sep-
aration of powers concerns. As Justice Souter observed in his
Hamdi concurrence:
For reasons of inescapable human nature, the branch of the
Government asked to counter a serious threat is not the
branch on which to rest the Nation's entire reliance in striking
the balance between the will to win and the cost in liberty on
the way to victory; the responsibility for security will naturally
amplify the claim that security legitimately raises. A reasonable
balance is more likely to be reached on the judgment of a dif-
ferent branch .... 172
Moreover, reading Hirota to create an open-ended exception
to habeas review has the practical consequence of assigning to a
foreign entity the power to suspend the remedy of habeas corpus.
There are strong structural reasons, however, for sustaining a read-
ing of the Suspension Clause that distinguishes between Congress
and a foreign sovereign:
[T]he Constitution nowhere permits the President, the treaty
makers, or Congress to delegate federal power completely
outside of the national government.... This law of conserva-
tion of federal power prevents the national government, as a
whole, from concealing or confusing the lines of government
authority and responsibility. When only US officers exercise
federal power under federal law, the people may hold the ac-
tions of the government accountable. 173
Whatever the Habeas Suspension Clause means in the final analysis,
then, it certainly does not permit the Executive branch, acting
alone, to outsource the suspension power to a foreign power.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Hirota provides no exception from the now five-decade-old rule
that citizens overseas properly invoke the habeas writ to secure in-
dependent scrutiny of the legal and factual bases of their detention.
Certainly, it does not stand for the proposition that multinational
authorization frees an American official, who exercises rank and
172. Id. at 545 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concur-
ring in the judgment).
173. John C. Yoo, UN Wars, US War Powers, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 355, 367 (2000).
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prestige as a consequence of a commission from the President,
from obeying constitutional norms. There is no "loaded weapon,"
to use Justice Jackson's famous phrase,17 4 concealed in the intricate
folds of Supreme Court jurisdictional doctrine, awaiting overzeal-
ous government counsel to wield it. Now, as in the past, interna-
tional entanglements can provide no backdoor from the domestic
obligations of the Constitution.
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